Software-update: VeraCrypt 1.18a

Versie 1.18a van VeraCrypt is uitgekomen. VeraCrypt is een fork van TrueCrypt, dat er een tijdje geleden mee is opgehouden. Met dit opensource-encryptieprogramma kunnen complete harde schijven of partities en virtuele volumes, zoals een bestand dat als partitie wordt benaderd, worden versleuteld. VeraCrypt gebruikt de originele broncode van TrueCrypt, maar bevat diverse verbeteringen met betrekking tot de beveiliging. Volumes die met TrueCrypt zijn aangemaakt kunnen vanaf deze versie wel geopend en geconverteerd worden. De Fransman Mounir Idrassi is al sinds de zomer van 2013 met dit project bezig. De changelog voor deze uitgave ziet er als volgt uit:

All OSs:

• Support Japanese encryption standard Camellia, including for Windows system encryption (MBR & EFI).
• Support Russian encryption and hash standards Kuznyechik, Magma and Streebog, including for Windows EFI system encryption.

Windows:

• Support EFI Windows system encryption (limitations: no hidden os, no boot custom message)
• Fix TrueCrypt vulnerability allowing detection of hidden volumes presence(reported by Ivanov Aleksey Mikhailovich, alekc96 [at] mail dot ru)
• Enhanced protection against dll hijacking attacks.
• Fix boot issues on some machines by increasing required memory by 1 KiB
• Add benchmarking of hash algorithms and PRF with PIM (including for pre-boot).
• Move build system to Visual C++ 2010 for better stability.
• Workaround for AES-NI support under Hyper-V on Windows Server 2008 R2.
• Correctly remove driver file veracrypt.sys during uninstall on Windows 64-bit.
• Implement passing smart card PIN as command line argument (/tokenpin) when explicitly mounting a volume.
• When no drive letter specified, choose A: or B: only when no other free drive letter is available.
• Reduce CPU usage caused by the option to disable use of disconnected network drives.
• Add new volume ID mechanism to be used to identify disks/partitions instead of their device name.
• Add option to avoid PIM prompt in pre-boot authentication by storing PIM value unencrypted in MBR.
• Add option and command line switch to hide waiting dialog when performing operations.
• Add checkbox in "VeraCrypt Format" wizard GUI to skip Rescue Disk verification during system encryption procedure.
• Allow files drag-n-drop when VeraCrypt is running as elevated process.
• Minor GUI and translations fixes.

Linux:

• Fix mount issue on Fedora 23.
• Fix mount failure when compiling source code using gcc 5.x.
• Adhere to XDG Desktop Specification by using XDG_CONFIG_HOME to determine location of configuration files.

MacOSX:

• Solve compatibility issue with newer versions of OSXFuse.

Versienummer	1.18a
Releasestatus	Final
Besturingssystemen	Windows 7, Linux, Windows XP, macOS, Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows 8, Windows 10
Website	Idrix
Download	https://veracrypt.codeplex.com/wikipage?title=Downloads
Bestandsgrootte	18,95MB
Licentietype	GPL

Reacties (4)

[Magic]

"Fix TrueCrypt vulnerability allowing detection of hidden volumes presence".

Hoe kan dit gefixed worden zonder het volume helemaal op de schop te gooien? Als het enkel in de software zit zou een kwaadwillende met de beschikking over de container toch gewoon een oude versie kunnen gebruiken? In dat geval is dus een hidden volume per defnitie niet veilig

[technorabilia]

Alleen nieuwe hidden volumes zijn dan inderdaad "veilig".

[TheBlackbird]

Windows EFI system encryption! Heb ik jaren op zitten wachten! Mooi.

Tot nu ging dat enkel met betalende applicaties als BestCrypt.

[ironx]

Reactie van idrassi (developer van VeraCrypt) betreffende hidden volume detection fix:

VeraCrypt Forum: detection of hidden volumes bug query

Luckily, there is an obvious way to protect about such attack: volumes should always have two headers! When there is no volume header, we just create a "fake" hidden volume that uses a random master key. This way, the distinguisher mentioned above will always return that there is a hidden volume without being able to say if the hidden volume is a fake one or not.

...

As for the reason why users of hidden volumes need to recreate their outer/inner volumes, it is because a change in the way random data is created in 1.18 compared to previous versions and 1.17: In TrueCrypt and VeraCrypt prior to 1.18, zeros were encrypted using a temporary key but I'm now suspicious about this choice of zeros so I decided to encrypt random data instead using a temporary for better entropy of resulting data.