Dť site mbt electronisch stemmen in de VS is www.blackboxvoting.com
en de bijbehorende research site www.blackboxvoting.org,
waar ook het gelijknamige boek gratis gedownload kan worden.
En niet te vergeten de uitgelekte interne memo's van de grootste fabrikant van stemmachines, Diebold, waaruit blijkt dat inderdaad goede reden tot ongerustheid is - http://www.house.gov/kucinich/issues/voting.htm.
Ook de stemmachines in Nederland zijn niet boven alle twijfel verheven.
Dezelfde machines ("Powervote" van NEDAP - www.nedap.nl
) worden gebruikt in Ierland. Daar is uit officieel onderzoek gebleken dat de beveiliging van die aparaten nogal te wensen over laat. Het rapport is wel openbaar, maar nooit gepubliceert. Het kan echter wel opgevraagd worden, hier een fragment:
Case study: Nedap/Powervote
There are many voting systems in existence that could have been chosen for this case study, but the one of greatest relevance in Ireland is the system recently adopted by the Irish government.
The Nedap/Powervote system utilises the existing manual authentication process to fulfill requirements 1 and 2 - voter authentication and privacy - as recommended. The rest of the Nedap system is less satisfactory, however.
In March 2002 the Department of the Environment and Local Government (DoELG) requested that Zerflow  carry out a security assessment of the Nedap/Powervote voting machines. The Zerflow report  which we obtained under the Freedom of Information Act  highlights some serious security flaws in the system. The report has not been published, and its findings have been lightly dismissed by the DoELG .
The training guide for polling station staff  recommends that staff "occasionally check that the ballot paper/screen has not been interfered with." There is no indication of what will happen if it has been interfered with, and if votes may be compromised.
The second major problem identified by Zerflow is that the backup cartridge is left in the voting machine after polls close. There is a danger that the backup will be altered or wiped while still in the machine. If the primary cartridge is unusable for some reason, it is vital that the backup cartridge has been kept secure.
The very fact that the voting machine has the capability to wipe the contents of the backup cartridge is worrying. Such features should be isolated from publicly accessible parts of the system. If the system contains such obviously bad design decisions, what else might it contain?