Het ontwikkelteam van OpenSSL, een bekend security programma dat encryptiefuncties aanbiedt, heeft twee nieuwe versies uitgebracht om een viertal beveiligingsproblemen op te lossen. Voor meer informatie over de beveiligingsproblemen verwijzen we jullie door naar deze pagina en de bijbehorende informatie die via de CVE-lijst van The MITRE Corporation gevonden kan worden. De versienummers zijn aangekomen bij 0.9.8d en 0.9.7l en voorzien van de volgende lijst met veranderingen:
Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d:
- Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]
- Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson]
- Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
- Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
- Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites match only those. Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too (since AES128-SHA got the same strength classification in 0.9.7h) as we currently only have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap. That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as "RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites -- namely, SSL 2.0 ciphersuites in addition to the more common ones from SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0.
So we change the selection algorithm again: Naming an explicit ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite, and any other similar ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions. Thus, "RC4-MD5" again will properly select both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite.
Since SSL 2.0 does not have any ciphersuites for which the 128/256 bit distinction would be relevant, this works for now. The proper fix will be to use different bits for AES128 and AES256, which would have avoided the problems from the beginning; however, bits are scarce, so we can only do this in a new release (not just a patchlevel) when we can change the SSL_CIPHER definition to split the single 'unsigned long mask' bitmap into multiple values to extend the available space. [Bodo Moeller]
Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l:[break]De volgende twee bestanden zijn binnen te halen:
- Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]
- Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson]
- Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
- Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
- Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA" will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions (so that "RC4-MD5" will still include both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite). This is a backport combining changes from 0.9.8b and 0.9.8d. [Bodo Moeller]
OpenSSL 0.9.8d
